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Berman: Pregnancy Leave and Equality

NOTES
CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION V. GUERRA:
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
HAS DETERMINED THAT PREGNANCY
MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR JOB
I. INTRODUCTION
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra, l the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the facial validity of California Government Code
section 12945(b)(2).2 The court vehemently rejected a federal
preemption argumentS and held that a law setting a minimum
1. Cal. Fed: Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Ferguson, J; Pregerson, J; Gilliam, J. sitting by designation), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3460
(U.S. Jan. 14, 1986) (No. 85-494).
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). Section 12945(b)(2) provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification:
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ... :
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time; provided, such period shall not exceed four
months. Such employee shall be entitled to utilize any accrued
vacation leave during this period of time. Reasonable period of
time means that period during which the female employee is
disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
ld. See infra note 71 for discussion of the significance of the law's specific application to
medical disabilities of pregnancy.
3. The employer argued that the state law was preempted because it created a disparity between the number of total disability leave days allowed for female and male
employees in job settings where medical disability leaves were not available at all or were
not available for as long as four months or where guaranteed reinstatement was not
available as California required in its application of the state law. Brief of Appellees at 5,
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d 390. The employer further claimed that federal
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leave for pregnancy disabilities did not, on its face, discriminate
against men or conflict with the purpose of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19644 as amended in 1978 by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).!>
The issue of whether the PDA allows any different treatment for pregnancy has divided the feminist community.6 All
agree that the PDA prevents employers from treating pregnant
employees less favorably than other temporarily disabled employees. The disputed question, however, is whether or not the
PDA allows employers to treat pregnant employees more favorably than other temporarily disabled employees. Supporters of
the California law claim favorable treatment is necessary to negate the harsh impact childbearing places on women when employers fail to provide sick leave which is adequate for either
recovery from normal childbirth7 or for common medical complilaw forbids any differential treatment of employees based on pregnancy. Id. at 8.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1981). Section 2000e-2(a) on employer practices provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). See infra note 19 for relevant language.
6. See Curtis, For Equality of the Sexes, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, June 1985, at 15 (general discussion of controversy). The controversy has sparked a debate among feminist
lawyers. See also Kreiger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controuersy: Equal Treatment,
Positiue Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE UL. REV. 513
(1983) (detailed discussion of both the controversy and the varying theoretical models of
sexual equality underlying the controverted positions). Miller- Wohl is a case that
presented the same preemption issue as Cal. Fed. Sau. & Loan Ass'n in a challenge to a
Montana law which mandated pregnancy disability leaves in that state. MillerWohl Co. v. Mont. Comm'r of Labor and Indus., _ Mont. - . 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont.
1984), appeal filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3718 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985). See also Williams, The
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS
L. REP. 175 (1981-82) (discussion supporting the "same treatment" or "equal treatment"
approach). But see Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 94 YALE LJ. 929 (1985) (advocating different treatment to accommodate
pregnancy).
'
7. Representatives of the medical community report that "the usual period of disa-
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cations of pregnancy.8 Those who oppose the state law insist
that the PDA compels employers to treat pregnant employees
absolutely the same as other temporarily disabled employees.9
Taking that position, the National Organization for Women
(NOW), the National Women's Political Caucus, the League of
Women Voters, and others, filed an amicus brief supporting the
saving and loan'siO argument for preemption.l l In sharp contrast, California Women Lawyers and Equal Rights Advocates I2
filed an amicus brief supporting appellant Guerra'siS (the
bility after birth is six to eight weeks. Thus, a disability claim of up to 12 weeks for a
normal pregnancy would be reasonable." S. !{AMERMAN, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 44-45 (1980) (emphasis in original) cited in Brief of Appellees at 36, Cal.
Fed. Sou. & Loan Ass'n.
8. Some of the medical complications of pregnancy are toxemia, marked by high
blood pressure and other symptoms, occurring to some degree in five to ten percent of
pregnant women; placenta praevia, caused by low implantation of the placenta, occurring
in approximately one in 500 pregnancies; and abruptio placentae, pre-birth separation of
the placenta, occurring in approximately one in 100 pregnancies. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA, MACROPAEDIA 14, at 981-82 (15th ed. 1975). Any multiple birth also significantly
complicates pregnancy. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 529 (15th
ed. 1976). Approximately 12.2 births in 1000 are twin and bed rest is sometimes recommended as a method of increasing fetal growth in women carrying multiple fetuses. Id. at
531,545.
9. Under this view, the minimum disability leave available to pregnant employees
under the PDA is also the maximum. The length of the leave cannot exceed that which is
available to disabled male employees.
10. California Federal Savings and Loan Association, a federally chartered savings
and loan association, was joined in its complaint by plaintiff Merchants and Manufacturers Association, a non-profit California corporation which is a trade association representing employers, and plaintiff California Chamber of Commerce, a non-profit California corporation which represents business entities throughout the state including
California Federal Savings and Loan Association. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Cal. Fed. Sau. & Loan Ass'n.
11. The pro-preemption amici claimed that the PDA prohibited any difference in
treatment of employees based on pregnancy. They argued that any sex-based distinction,
even well intended, had the effect of limiting women's role in the workplace. Brief for
Amici Curiae at 5, Cal. Fed. Sau. & Loan Ass'n. However, they markedly differed from
the employer, whose interpretation of the PDA they supported, in urging the court to
construe section 12945(b)(2) as requiring employers to provide up to four months of disability leave to employees of both sexes as an effective cure to any fatal sex-based distinction within the law. Id. at 43. See generally BABCOCK, FREEMAN, NORTON & Ross, SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 19-53, 268-72 (1975) (how protective legislation has impacted on women in the workplace).
12. Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. is a San Francisco-based public interest law firm
engaged in women's advocacy and specializing in the area of sex discrimination. This
firm argued that the California law was consistent with the legislative intent behind passage of the PDA which was to prevent working women who are also childbearers from
being denied equal employment opportunities. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 5, Cal. Fed.
Sau. & Loan Ass'n.
13. Mark Guerra is the State of California's Director of the Department of Fair Em-
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state's) contention that section 12945(b)(2) was not inconsistent
with Title VII and that states could lawfully mandate leaves to
prevent pregnant workers from being fired as a consequence of
the inadequate sick leave policies of employers, whether or not
similar disability leaves were available to other employees. I4
II. BACKGROUND

A.

FEDERAL LAW

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful to
discriminate in employment on the basis of sex.It> However, in
1976 the Supreme Court held in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert I6 that an otherwise comprehensive benefit plan which excluded pregnancy coverage was not unlawful sex discrimination
under Title VII.I7 Outraged by the Court's conclusion that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination on
the basis of sex although only women get pregnant, Congress responded with the enactment of the PDA18 which unequivocally
defined discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as sex
discrimination. I9
ployment and Housing. Also named as defendants were Cruz F. Sandoval, as Chair Commissioner of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission, and the Fair Employment
and Housing Commission of the State of California.
14. Under this view, the PDA defines only the minimum disability leave available to
pregnant employees. They must be treated at least as well as male workers who become
temporarily disabled; however, a greater benefit is permissible to mitigate the burden
childbearing places only on female workers.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1981).
16. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
17. Id. at 133-40 (excluding pregnancy from otherwise inclusive employee insurance
plans held not to violate Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex
because the differentiation was between pregnant and non-pregnant employees with the
latter group comprised of women as ooowell as men).
18. See S. Rep. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1978).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). It provides;
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
Id.
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The only Supreme Court case interpreting the PDA is N ewport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC.20 There, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission21 cited the employer for failing to provide maternity health benefits to spouses
of male employees that were equal to the maternity health benefits provided to female employees. The Court held that giving a
less complete benefit package to male workers was discrimination against men on the basis of sex and that the greater cost of
providing comparable maternity benefits for spouses of male employees did not justify the inequity in coverage. 22 The test of
whether the employment benefits given to male and female employees by an employer were equal was not a comparison of the
number of dollars spent on employees of each sex but rather a
comparison of the comprehensiveness of the benefit package
provided for employees of each sex. 23
B.

STATE LAW

California responded to the Gilbert decision by passing
Government Code section 12945(b)(2)24 requiring employers
subject to Title VIp5 to provide a reasonable leave of up to four
months to employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions. As construed by the state,26 the law requires
employers to reinstate such workers to the same or a similar position unless the employer can show a business necessity which
reasonably justifies noncompliance.27 However, the law does not
20. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). See Note, 61 U. DET. J. URB. L. 663 (Summer 1984).
21. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is responsible for enforcement
of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1981).
22. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676-85.
23.Id.
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1982). Assembly Bill 1960 (1977-78 Reg.
Sess.) created a statute which preceded Government Code section 12945(b)(2) and was
intended to protect all pregnant employees from inadequate leave policies. Such protection was formerly only available to employees of school districts. Cal. SummBry Digest at
374.
25. Government Code section 12945(e) makes section 12945(b)(2) applicable to employers such as Cal Fed that are subject to Title VII. "The provisions of this section,
except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), shall be inapplicable to any employer subject to
Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964." CAL. Gov. CODE § 12945(e) (West 1982)
(emphasis added). Title VII applies to employers who have 15 or more employees and
who are engaged in interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·(b) (1981).
26. The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, an appellant in
the instant case, interpreted and enforced this law for the state. See supra note 13.
27. Opening Brief of State Appellants at 7, Cal. Fed. Sao. & Loan Ass'n.
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require paid leaves for pregnant employees greater than those
available to other disabled employees.2s Moreover, pregnant
workers are not automatically entitled to the maximum four
month leave because employers affected by the law are only required to provide that leave which pregnant employees medically require up to a maximum of four months. 29
C.

FACTS OF CASE

In 1982 Lillian Garland,30 a receptionist/PBX operator employed by California Federal Savings and Loan Association (Cal
Fed), took a four month maternity leave. In spite of her request
to return to work at the end of the leave, Cal Fed did not reinstate her for an additional seven months.31 When California's
Department of Fair Employment and Housing served a complaint· on Cal Fed alleging a violation of section 12945(b)(2),a2
Cal Fed filed a suit for declaratory relief claiming that Title VII
preempted the law because the California statute required different treatment of male and female employees on the basis of
pregnancy.33 On cross-motions for summary judgment, Cal Fed
prevailed. The district court held that Title VII preempted the
California law because it discriminated against males on the basis of pregnancy.34 The state appealed the ruling to the United
28. Questions and Answers on Pregnancy, California's Dep't of Fair Empl. and
Hous., Question 23.
29. ld. at Question 1.
30. The'district court denied Garland's motion to intervene as a defendant. She appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit which found that the issues raised by her appeal did not go to the merits of the case. These issues were addressed in a separate,
unpublished memorandum. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan ,Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393.
31. Cal Fed's leave policy was gender-neutral on its face but did not guarantee reinstatement of employees on pregnancy disability leave to the same or a similar position as
required under the state's interpretation of section 12945(b)(2). Opening Brief of State
Appellants at 4, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. Under its policy, "Cal Fed reserve[d] the
right to terminate an employee on leave of absence if a similar and suitable position
[was] not available ...•" Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 392 n.4.
32. California interprets the leave requirement as, by inference, creating a presumption of reinstatement to the same or a similar position at the end of the leave period,
unless not doing so is justified by business necessity. Brief of Appellees at 5, Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n.
33. Because Cal Fed did not guarantee reinstatement to other temporarily disabled
employees, the state law compelled the employer to treat employees disabled by pregnancy differently than other temporarily disabled employees.
34. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393.
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States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 35
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
To determine whether California Government Code section
12945(b)(2) was preempted by Title VII as amended by the
PDA, the Ninth Circuit first explored the scope of Title VII preemption. The court looked to Title VII's own preemption provisions36 and found that the plain language of Title VII37 did not
preclude additional state anti-discrimination laws unless they
were inconsistent with any of the purposes of Title VII.3s It concluded, therefore, that the scope of Title VII preemption was
very narrow and that state law was only preempted when it promoted an employment practice which was inconsistent with Title VII's goal of equality in employment opportunity.39
.
The court thus had to determine whether the state statute
was detrimental to that goal. Here the court avoided a broad
35. [d. at 392.
36. Title VII's preemption provisions state:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or
political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which
would be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter.
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-7 (1981) (emphasis supplied by Ninth Circuit);
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed
as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the
field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State
laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of
this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State
law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1981) (emphasis supplied by Ninth Circuit).
37. The court looked to the plain language and legislative history of Title VII using
the approach followed by the Supreme Court in determining whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted state disability law in Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1983). The Supreme Court noted in Shaw that "Title VII
does not itself prevent States from extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not
covered by Title VII ..•. n [d. at 103.
38. Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994, 998 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (purpose of preemption provisions of Title VII was to preserve state anti-discrimination laws but eradicate
inconsistent laws).
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (Title VII enacted to further
equality in employment opportunities).
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ruling either on whether Title VII itself mandated adequate
pregnancy disability leaves40 or whether section 12945(b)(2)
might be discriminatory as applied in some factual settings.41
The court decided only the permissibility of the state action in
light of Title VII as amended by the PDA.42 Citing recent Supreme Court decisions that recognized the authority of states to
freely legislate in non-preempted areas without any substitution
by the judiciary of its judgment for that of elected lawmakers,43
the court also avoided an inquiry into whether extant leave policies actually justified the state action. It decided only the facial
validity of section 12945(b)(2).
Before turning its focus to the effect of the PDA on employment discrimination law,44 the Ninth Circuit first distinguished
pregnancy disability from unlawful employment classifications
which are based on sex stereotypes45 and not actual biological
differences. 46
The court then recognized the history of the PDA as a congressional response to the Supreme Court's failure in General
40. The state urged this position. Opening Brief of State Appellants at 21, Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n (inadequate leave policy is a prima facie violation of Title VII).
41. Cal Fed urged this position. Brief of Appellees at 30, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n (California law requires a four month pregnancy disability leave when the employer does not provide a four month disability leave for other medical conditions). See
supra note 3 for discussion of Cal Fed's argument.
42. This was the narrow issue raised by the district court's conclusion that section
12945(b)(2) was impermissible as a matter of law on cross-motions for summary judgment. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 394. "We need not determine, as the
litigants would have us do, whether Title VII compels employers to grant reasonable
pregnancy disability leave to protect women from the potentially disparate impact of
facially neutral, but inadequate, disability leave policies; we need only decide whether
section 12945(b)(2) is permissible under Title VII."· Id.
43. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1015 (1985)
(city transit system not exempt from federal wage regulations); Hawaii Housing Auth. v.
Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2328-31 (1984) (where a state found a substantial reason for
exercising its power to pass a law redistributing ownership in land, courts should defer to
the judgment of the state legislature).
44. This was the issue at the heart of the feminist controversy.
45. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977) (archaic stereotyped assumptions such as viewing women and not men as dependent spouses cannot be used to justify dissimilar treatment of women and men).
46. The Ninth Circuit noted, "[B]ecause section 12945(b)(2) deals with a condition
that is unique to women-pregnancy disability rather than, say, parenting-our decision
has no bearing on the lawfulness of state statutes or employment practices that classify
on the basis of purportedly sex-linked factors that are actually less biological than stereotypical." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 395.
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Electric Co. v. Gilbert47 to require employers to provide pregnancy benefits in otherwise complete healthcare packages. It
concluded that while the language of the PDA is ambiguous as
to whether any distinction based on pregnancy is permissible,48
the PDA was intended to adopt the Gilbert dissent49 which did
allow the recognition of pregnancy in employment policies.lIo
The court also relied on Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOClil to determine whether equality of treatment
compelled employers to give the same total number of disability
leave days to both men and women. In Newport News, the Supreme Court explained that the cost of the employee's benefit
package was not the appropriate measure of equality.1I2 Rather,
it was necessary to look at the comprehensiveness of the benefit
coverage offered to both sexes to see if equal treatment was
achieved. 53 In Newport News, although it cost more for employers to provide wives of male employees with the same health
benefits available to female employees, the additional cost of the
male benefit package was a necessary means of achieving equally
complete benefits for employees of both sexes. The Ninth Circuit, by analogy, concluded that the number of disability leave
days offered by the employer, like the number of dollars spent
by the employer, was not the appropriate measure of equality of
employment opportunity. Looking instead to the completeness
of the benefit offered to employees of both sexes, the court
found that offering pregnancy leaves only to female workers did
not deprive the male employees of a benefit that they too required. 54 Since men do not get pregnant, the court reasoned that
47. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
48. The court recognized "a tension between the PDA's first clause, which subjects
pregnancy to the same types of discrimination analysis to which it subjects sex, and its
second clause, which appears to demand pregnancy-neutral policies at all times." Id. at
396. See supra note 19 for relevant language.
49. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 159. "A realistic understanding of conditions found in today's labor environment warrants taking pregnancy into account in fashioning disability policies." Id.
5!. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). See supra notes 20, 22-23 and accompanying text.
52. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 685 n.26. See Note, Sexual Equality Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 690, 711-12 (1983) (differential in
amount spent on benefits to male and female employees supported by legislative history
of PDA).
53. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676 (comparison of the comprehensiveness of protection afforded to female and male employees is proper test of discrimination).
54. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "equality under the PDA must be measured
in employment opportunity, not necessarily in amounts of money expended-or amounts
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denying them pregnancy leaves did not result in a less complete
benefit package and thus did not discriminate against men. 55
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the state law was not preempted because it did not on its face promote an illegal employment practice inconsistent with Title VII.56
The court concluded that requiring the law to be totally
blind to pregnancy made no sense. 57 It determined that because
Title VII protects employees from sexual discrimination resulting from the disparate impact of facially neutral employment
policies,58 employees must be afforded the same protection from
pregnancy discrimination which was incorporated into Title VII
by the PDA. Thus the state could act prophylactically to prevent the disparate impact of facially neutral but inadequate disability leave policies on pregnant workers.59
IV. CRITIQUE
In rejecting the district court's holding that a state law
guaranteeing minimal pregnancy disability leaves discriminated
against men, the Ninth Circuit admonished the lower court for
reaching a conclusion that defied common sense. so Fortunately,
of days of disability leave expended. Equality in the disability context compares coverage
to actual need, not coverage to hypothetical identical needs." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 396.
55. The Ninth Circuit explained that because male employees do not get pregnant,
failing to give them pregnancy disability leaves causes their total disability package to
suffer "no consequent diminution." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393.
56. Id. at 396.
57. The court explained that "[a]ttributing to Congress an intent that employers or
states must ignore pregnancy completely when fashioning their disability policies would
be as absurd as discovering a congressional intent that states or employers must completely ignore prostatitis on pain of violating Title VII." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
758 F.2d at 395.
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Some statistical showing of
a disparate impact is used,to prove Title VII discrimination under a disparate impact
analysis. See, e.g., id. at 430 n.6. However, in Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, where a state
law was challenged, the court determined that the state could act under Title VII to
prevent a disparate impact. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 396. Thus the court
avoided determining whether there was any actual discriminatory impact on pregnant
employees. See infra note 70 for further discussion of disparate impact.
59. The court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the case with
instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the state. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 397.
60. The court began its analysis by holding "that the district court's conclusion that
section 12945(b)(2) discriminates against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common
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rational thinking prevailed in the Ninth Circuit opinion. The
Ninth Circuit appropriately applied analogous case law, but also
displayed a healthy reliance on common sense for its crucial interpretation of the PDA where guidance was limited.
The court confronted the fact that blindly requiring the
same treatment for female and male employees in every situation leads to an intuitively incorrect result when, as here, a distinction is made based on an inherent sexual difference.61 Depriving women of a benefit necessary for them to achieve
employment equality essentially because men don't happen to
need it is illogical as well as unjust. 62 That result reveals the flaw
in an inflexible interpretation of the PDA.63 Rather than offering
women employment equality, such an interpretation subtly undermines it by perpetuating the use of male needs as the determinant of women's benefits. 64
The court adopted a more humanistic approach.6 Newport
!)

sense, misinterprets case law and flouts Title VII and the PDA." Cal. Fed. Sao. & Loan
Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393.
61. The ability to become pregnant is a biological, female characteristic in contrast
to a sexual stereotype such as attributing to women a superior ability to parent. See
supra note 46 for Ninth Circuit's discussion of the distinction.
62. See Kreiger & Cooney, supra note 6, at 544-57, who discuss the flaws in the
"same treatment" model of equality. That model causes inequitable results not only because it is based on the erroneous assumption that the sexes are the same, but also because men provide the normative standard by which both men and women are measured.
[d. at 545. The authors stress the need to focus on equality in effect rather than equality
in treatment. [d. at 557.
63. The flaw will become more dramatic if there is a revival of anti-abortion laws. In
that event, women who become pregnant will be compelled to bear a child, yet states will
be unable to pass laws to safeguard their jobs when they become temporarily disabled by
the birth.
64. This results from adherence to a rigid model of equality which cannot take into
account the most basic sexual difference, pregnancy. If the PDA requires employers to
give women only those benefits that male workers get, women are wrongly hindered by
benefits that reflect the demands of an anachronistic, male·dominated workforce.
Realistically, employers such as Cal Fed resist any expansion of benefits that increase their cost of doing business. Note, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the instant suit
was brought by employers asserting their own interests and not by male employees. Cal.
Fed. Sao. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393 n.6. If the Supreme Court finds the state statute
preempted as a matter of law, employers will then use the rigidity of the PDA to avoid
any additional expenditure to accommodate childbirth. If Cal Fed is any example, employers will not voluntarily expand benefits to employees of both sexes to accommodate
female employees without creating differences in treatment. They will strongly oppose
future legislation that mandates such broad expansion and claim that it makes the cost
of doing business unnecessarily high.
65. The court concluded that by enacting the PDA "Congress intended to reverse
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News, although a different factual setting, compels a comparison
of the ultimate effects of employment benefits or practices on
employees to determine whether men and women are being
treated equally.66 The controlling factor is not the cost to the
employer but the impact on the employees.67 In Newport News,
both male and female employees who had children had to meet
the medical expenses of childbirth, so the issue as to whether an
employee or the spouse of an employee literally bore the child
was irrelevant. Therefore, employees of both sexes shared the
same need and had to be treated alike. In contrast, pregnancy
disability leave is only necessary for the employee actually giving birth, who will always be a woman. Since only women can
become pregnant, mandating pregnancy disability leaves does
not discriminate against men because men are not being deprived of a benefit they need. 68 That result makes sense. 69
Gilbert, to require employers to include pregnancy disability leave in their otherwise
comprehensive benefit packages, and thus to construct a floor beneath which pregnancy
disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise." Id. at
396. Although the court did not mention Williams, supra note 6, at 196, this language
seems to be a direct response to her "same treatment" argument that "[t)he equality
approach to pregnancy (such as that embodied in the PDA) necessarily creates not only
the desired floor under the pregnant woman's rights but also the ceiling . . . ." Id. The
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the proposition that the benefit floor must also be the ceiling. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 396.
In a more recent article defending the "same treatment" model of equality, Williams
agreed that disparate impact analysis should be available to prove pregnancy discrimination as it is to prove other kinds of Title VII discrimination. Williams, Equality's Riddle:
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.D. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985). However, she argued that because the PDA proscribes laws that
make any distinction based on pregnancy, a state cannot pass a law such as section
12945(b)(2) to prevent the possible disparate impact on pregnant women of neutral leave
policies. Id. at 348, 368. Rather, a female employee can only make use of disparate impact analysis to prove an individual claim brought under Title VII. Id. at 372-73. Her
approach maintains the purity of the "same treatment" model but offers little real help
to working women harmed by inadequate leave policies. Costly individual law suits involving the inherent discovery and proof problems of disparate impact claims are hardly
a practical solution for most workers disabled by pregnancy.
66. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676.
67. Id. at 685 n.26.
68. See supra note 55 for the Ninth Circuit's explanation.
69. As the Ninth Circuit aptly explained:
Citing Newport News for the rule that employers may
disregard a state statutory obligation to provide pregnancy
disability leave stands that case on its head. Newport News
extended a pregnancy benefit, while Cal Fed seeks to limit
one. Newport News measured equivalence of benefits by the
comprehensiveness of their coverage of the disabilities to
which each sex is subject, while Cal Fed seeks to measure
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Each side in the feminist controversy over whether the PDA
allows a more favorable disability policy for pregnant workers
points to the wording of the PDA for support.70 The court wisely
distanced itself from the futile scrutiny of the language of the
PDA and looked to the broad context of both the PDA and Title
VII to determine the compatibility of section 12945(b)(2).
The Ninth Circuit accurately distinguished pregnancy from
impermissible stereotypical assumptions. 71 Sensibly, the court
then recognized that an interpretation of the PDA requiring total blindness to pregnancy was inconsistent with the PDA's own
history,72 with Title VII, and with common knowledge. 73 The
PDA extended the safeguards of Title VII to pregnancy.74 Title
equality of benefits by the sameness of coverage despite differences in need.
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393.
70. One side claimed that the wording "same treatment" should be taken literally.
See supra note 17 for the text of the PDA. The other claimed that defining discrimination on the basis of sex as including "on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth" entitled
these conditions to the remedial treatment available to other Title VII-protected classifications when a disparate impact is shown. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
at 429-31 (1971) (eliminated test requirement applied to all employees but which was not
related to job performance and acted to perpetuate discrimination); Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140-43 (1977) (neutral seniority plan unlawful because loss of seniority by women on pregnancy leave imposed a substantial burden on women). A disparate
impact justifies different treatment to prevent the unjust result. See United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Title VII does not prohibit affirmative action plans).
However, if the PDA specifically forbids greater disability leaves for pregnancy than are
available for other disabilities, this remedy is not available to prevent pregnancy discrimination. See supra note 56 for further discussion of Griggs.
Studying the language of the PDA to resolve the controversy is futile because the
language is self-contradicting: the first clause seemingly giving pregnancy the same
"privileges" as other protected classifications and the second clause seemingly restricting
those "privileges" in the case of pregnancy. See supra note 48 for the Ninth Circuit's
description of the ambiguity.
71. It is significant that section 12945(b)(2) does not require maternity leaves for all
pregnant workers. Doing so would impermissibly assume that all pregnant women need a
long leave. This would distort the true biological difference, changing the distinction to
an overbroad stereotyped assumption. Because the law only requires leaves when medically necessary, it is clear that only the biological difference is being addressed; the time
is required for childbirth or medical complications, but not for providing child care-a
role that can be undertaken by either sex.
72. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
73. While some argue that pregnancy should be treated the same as any physical
disability, it is common knowledge that pregnancy is different. If it must be distinguished more specifically, it is at least different in the large number of workers affected
by it, see infra note 78, its status as a fundamental right, and in its likely "result," a new
life. None of these distinctions is insignificant.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
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VII provides protection from. the disparate impact on one sex of
facially neutral employment policies.75 It would be inconsistent
and illogical to deny disparate impact protection to pregnant
women when it is available to other groups protected under Title VII. In fact, to deny disparate impact protection to pregnancy would itself be discrimination against pregnancy.
Notably absent from the Ninth Circuit's inquiry into
whether the state law was permissible were public policy considerations. States have a strong interest in preventing the termination of pregnant workers. Laws such as section 12945(b)(2) are
especially important because of the likelihood that inadequate
leave policies are most prevalent in the very kind of non-unionized positions traditionally held by women.76 With an increasing
number of households supported solely or to a significant extent
by women,77 many of whom are likely to get pregnant,78 the termination of pregnant workers can have a devastating financial
effect on families 79 and on state welfare program~. In addition to
75. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 430 (1971).
76. While the number of women in the labor force has increased in the last few
years, four out of five of these new jobs have been in the service area. Most women work
in low-paying jobs without opportunities for advancement, such as waitressing or food
service, health care, clerical or child care work. San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 29, 1985, at
H8, col. 1.
77. Families headed by female householders with no spouse present: 1970, 10.8%;
1980, 14.5~;'; 1983, 15.4%. USA Statistics in Brief, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Supp. 1985. Married couple families with husband and wife employed: 1970,
29.4~;'; 1980, 44.8%; 1984,48.7%. Id. at 399. Of married couple families with husband
unemployed, the percent having only wife employed: 1970, 33.4%; 1980, 39.5%; 1984,
41.7%. Id. The census bureau reported these additional findings for 1984: 28% of the
births by 18 to 24 year olds were to unmarried women; of women past age 30 who gave
birth, 52~;, were working or looking for work, up from 28% in 1976; women with no high
school diploma had the highest birth rate at 81.9 per 1000; women with three years of
college or more had the lowest rate with 54.8 per 1000; women with family incomes of
less than $10,000 had a rate of 88.5 births per 1000; the rate dropped to 46 per 1000 for
women in families with an income above $35,000 a year. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 4,
1985, at 2, col. 5.
78. "Eighty-five percent of working women are likely to become pregnant at least
once during their working lives." Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, supra note 6, at 930 n.7 (citing S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P.
KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 25 (1983».
79. In a study conducted for the congressional Joint Economic Committee, it was
reported that "the share of national income going to families with children has dropped
19 percent since 1973." San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 26, 1985, at 8, col. 1. The statistics
indicated that families with single female heads had a mean income last year of $13,257,
less than 40% of the $34,379 average income for two-parent families. Id. See supra note
63 suggesting the possible impact of anti-abortion legislation.
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self-reliant families, procreation is also an important government interest. 8o The value of children both to families who want
them and to society should not be ignored. Pregnancy should be
accommodated, not punished.
V. CONCLUSION
California Government Code section 12945 (b)(2) protects
pregnant workers from possible termination as a result of disability leave policies that fail to take pregnancy into account. It
mitigates the additional burden faced by female employees because of their unique biological role as childbearers. Title VII
and the PDA were intended to further equality of the sexes in
employment opportunity. The California law is consistent with
that goal because removing a barrier that confronts only women
does not create an injustice to men. An interpretation of the
PDA that prohibits recognition of pregnancy as an inherent and
exclusively female characteristic refutes common knowledge and
perpetuates the use of a male normative standard in employment policies. It illogically forbids a specific state intervention to
remedy pregnancy discrimination, while failure to take pregnancy into -account results in harm which states have an interest
in preventing. The Ninth Circuit's rebuke of the preemption attack on section 12945(b)(2) was a victory both for women's
equality and for common sense.

Susan Spalter Berman*

80. A declining birthrate "could lead to a loss of 'national vigor' and declining pro·
ductivity, according to experts who gathered recently at the Hoover Institute at Stanford
University." San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 8, 1985, at E1, col. 1.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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